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Justice and Truth in Political Discourse
John L. McCormack*

INTRODUCTION

Since the Watergate scandal, campaign finance reform has been the

focus of a great deal of national attention.1 Legislation has attempted to
limit the amount that individuals or various entities may contribute to
2
candidates or spend on political advertising or campaigns. Although
3
the public generally supports campaign finance reform, reforms

implemented thus far have not been effective in appreciably reducing
4
campaign costs and the role of large contributions.

Reform of campaign finance presents difficult political and legal
problems.

Regulation of campaign contributions has proved to be

difficult. Contributions may facilitate lobbying of public officials that
can be positive. Lobbying may inform as well as persuade. It is clearly
an activity protected by the First Amendment; however, campaign
contributions may promote individual or special interests that may
conflict with the common good. Because of the need to finance costly
campaigns, elected officials tend to give more attention to major

contributors. 5

*

This

provides

these

well-financed

interests

Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.

1. See William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chancefor Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw. U.

L. REV. 335 (2000) (discussing problems with current campaign finance regulations and
proposing a decentralized solution).
2. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C. (2000
& Supp. 2003)).
3.

Keating Holland, Poll: Americans Favor Campaign FinanceReform Efforts, CNN.com, at

http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/03/16/cnn.poll/ (Mar. 16, 2001) (stating that 54
percent of Americans support the passage of new campaign finance reform).
4. See Michael Saxl & Maeghan Maloney, The BipartisanCampaign Reform Act: Unintended
Consequences and the Maine Solution, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465 (2004) (discussing a loophole

in the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 that allows large contributions to play a
role in campaigns via non-party organizations).
5.

John McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way Forward,3 ELECTION L.J. 115, 116

(2004) (discussing office holders' and candidates' constant need for money and the human
tendency to reward large donors with favorable public policies).
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disproportionate access to public officials.6 Such disproportionate
access makes it probable that these interests will have reater influence
in the making of laws and the process of government. Consequently,
the interests of the rich and otherwise more powerful tend to be
promoted, perhaps at the expense of the less powerful and the common
good.8
Campaign expenditures have proved to be even more difficult to
regulate than contributions. 9 The First Amendment has been among the
most serious obstacles to campaign finance reform. 1° In Buckley v.
Valeo,II the United States Supreme Court invalidated portions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.12 The Court
held that the Act's expenditure limitations negatively impacted political
speech and could not be upheld unless supported by a compelling state
interest. 13 Since no compelling state interest was found, the expenditure
limits were found invalid. 14 However, the contribution limits were
valid since they involved only "marginal restriction" upon speech and
could be justified by the state's interest in eliminating corruption or the
15
appearance of corruption.
THE PROBLEM MAY BE GREATER THAN JUST CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Campaign finance in other developed democracies indicates that
campaign finance reform may be accomplished despite the formidable
legal and political obstacles. 6 However, campaign finance reform is
6. See Steve France, Campaign Cash Cops: Reformers Fight Precedent and 'Evil
Special
InterestMan', A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 24 (reporting that proponents of campaign finance
reform
feel that the views of large contributors drown out the voices of average citizens).
7. See McCain, supra note 5, at 117 (discussing the affidavits of politicians, corporate
officials, and political scientists affirming that contributions purchased influence over
public
policy).
8. See id at 120 (arguing that candidates' attention to large donors creates a
sense of
disempowerment in the average American and erodes a citizen's incentive to participate
in civic
life).
9. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976) (invalidating the limitation of a candidate's
expenditures from his own personal funds and on overall campaign expenditures as violations
of
the First Amendment).
10. There have been others. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 346-54 (discussing the Supreme
Court's reliance upon the First Amendment in its Buckley decision).
11. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
12. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. (2000)) (imposing,
inter
alia, overall limitations on campaign expenditures and political contributions).
13. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-58.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 20-21.
16. See, e.g., Keith D. Ewing, Promoting Political Equality: Spending Limits in
British
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only part of the solution to the problem of big money speaking too
loudly in policy formulation. Money can also buy modem methods of
other
molding public opinion: through television, radio, the internet,
17
The
relations.
public
of
science
and
art
media, and the modem
of
power
the
imagined
have
Framers of our Constitution could hardly
availability
these modem methods of mass persuasion, and their greater
to those able to pay for them. This power may pose a challenge to the
democratic process even more formidable than campaign finance. The
force of these techniques can be especially effective where complex or
difficult to grasp issues are involved. In today's complex society,
ordinary citizens are often ill-equipped to understand the issues
involved in technical areas such as taxation.
Campaign finance reform focuses on the problem of special interests
buying access to, and influencing, public officials. Even if an effective
system of campaign finance reform were to be implemented, however,
influence buyers can still do an "end run" by going directly to the public
via the mediums describe above. Public officials are then influenced by
what their constituents believe or what the officials think they believe.
There is nothing inherently wrong with this, because in the democratic
process, an informed citizenry may properly influence the government
that represents them. However, if citizens are misled and ill-informed
by well-funded special interests, the process becomes dysfunctional.
Lies and misrepresentations have always been involved in American
political discourse. But under the marketplace of ideas concept, if the
marketplace is working, free and open discussion is supposed to
separate lies from the truth, good ideas from bad. First Amendment
freedom of speech values are a basic foundation for this concept.
Freedom to attempt to persuade others is a fundamental right, and it
would be very dangerous to tamper with this right. There may be,
however, grounds for fine-tuning First Amendment rights to prevent the
consistent drowning of the truth in a torrent of professionally fashioned
law);
ElectoralLaw, 2 ELECTION L.J. 499 (2003) (discussing spending controls in British election
Fiss-ian
and
Constitutionalism,
Comparative
Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation,
to the
Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 265, 284-95 (2003) (exploring the benefits of looking
Amendment
First
illuminate
to
order
in
constitutional case law of other Western democracies
jurisprudence in the United States); Andrew C. Geddis, Democratic Visions and Third-Party
Independent Expenditures: A Comparative View, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5 (2001)
(examining the methods used in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada to regulate
money and elections).
or
17. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Election Reform and Democratic Objectives-Match
on the
Mismatch?, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 205, 224 (1991) (noting that "restrictions
and
expenditure of money within campaigns [only led to] increased expenditures on lobbying
other public relations efforts").
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and disseminated lies. Functional democracy assumes input from an
informed public, not a public distracted or misled by falsehoods.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAx AND THE MANIPULATION OF PUBLIC THOUGHT

The current attempt to repeal the Federal Estate Tax is an apt
example of how modem methods of mass persuasion can be employed
to mold public opinion about a political issue. In the course of selling
the elimination of the tax, repeal proponents persuaded many people
that it was a tax that impacted a large percentage of decedents' estates
upon death. Among other arguments furthering this misperception, the
tax was presented as a threat to small business, family farms, and the
economy itself. These arguments ranged from utter untruth to distortion
of fact. The behavior of the purveyors of this misinformation was
particularly egregious because the Federal Estate Tax is a subject that is
hard for many people to understand, and thus easy to misconstrue.
Indeed, the tax is an arcane subject little understood except mainly by
lawyers and accountants who specialize in estate planning. Perhaps,
more importantly, these untruths and distortions also distracted
interested citizens from adequately considering real issues about the tax.
A national debate about the tax is appropriate, however, provided that
the debate focuses on the actual tax and its real impact.
In order to fully grasp the nature of this manipulation of public
opinion, this essay will review the mechanics of the Federal Estate Tax.
In discussing the tax with some of its critics, the author learned that
those critics did not really appreciate some important aspects of how the
tax really works. 18 Understanding the basics of the tax is necessary to
evaluate, correctly, most arguments for or against its repeal. The author
has summarized the basic features of the tax in the next section. The
author will then review the highlights of the centuries-old debate about
death taxes and the right of governments to impose them. The author
will then turn to the most recent campaign for the repeal of the Federal
Estate Tax, discussing the role played by hired professionals in
persuading the public. The author will conclude by making some
suggestions for reform.

18. For example, some critics of the tax said it should be repealed because of its
impact on
small business. They apparently did not realize that there was an alternative to repeal-raising
the exemption so the estates of small business owners would not be taxed-that could
adequately
address this concern. Some critics also complained that "the government" should
not decide
which charities or charitable activities should get a decedent's money without realizing
that the
charitable deduction gave decedents the right to pass wealth tax free to numerous
qualified
charities.
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A BRIEF PRIMER ON THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX

Very few estates have to pay federal estate taxes, and an estate tax
return does not even have to be filed for most estates. In 1976, 139,11519
estates.
estates incurred tax, or 7.65% of all adult decedents'
taxable estates in
However, between 1982 and 1993, the percentage of
2
0
percent.
1.82
than
higher
no
been
any given year has
A return does not even have to be filed, generally, unless the value of
the estate exceeds the exemption. When the estate tax was enacted in
1916, the exemption was $50,000.21 Over the years, the exemption was
changed until it was raised to $600,000 and remained at that figure until
1997. In 1998, it was raised to $625,000, $650,000 in 1999, and
$675,000 in 2000-01.22 The estate tax repeal Act provides for a series
of increases in the exemption to a maximum of $3,500,000 in 2009 with
of the tax in 2011 unless
repeal in 2010 followed by reinstatement
23
Congress acts to permanently repeal it.
The federal tax code also provides for a "stepped-up basis" for assets
in the estate. 24 If the owner of property sells it, a capital gains tax
may be imposed on the difference between what the owner paid for
25 If the heirs
the property and what the buyer paid the owner for it.
or other takers sell property they received from a decedent's estate,
capital gains tax will be computed, basically, by subtracting from the
price received from the buyer the value of the property when the
decedent owner died or at a time within six months of when the
decedent died. 26 The stepped-up basis usually gives the heirs or
other takers a very substantial income tax break because the property
is usually worth much more at the time of the decedent's death than it
19.

BARRY W. JOHNSON & MARTHA BRITTON ELLER, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

FEDERAL TAXATION OF INHERITANCE AND WEALTH TRANSFERS 18, 19, at http://www.irs.gov/

pub/irs-soi/inhwlttr.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2005). During the 1990's, the tax generated a little
more than one percent of federal revenues in any given year. Id. However, this amounts to
roughly $30 billion annually, about nine percent of all discretionary federal spending. WILLIAM
H. GATES SR. & CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH: WHY AMERICA
SHOULD TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES 91-92 (2002).
20. JOHNSON & ELLER, supra note 19, at 19.
21. Id at 13.
22. Jay D. Waxenberg, Preparation and Audit of the United States Estates Tax Return, in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING ESTATE, GIFT, AND FIDUCIARY INCOME TAX
RETURNS, 2003: STRATEGIES FOR MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE WITH THE "706," "709," & "1041"
(2003).
23. Id.

24. 26 U.S.C. § 1014 (2000 & Supp. I 2001), amended by P.L. 108-357, § 413(c)(18), 118
Stat. 1508.
25.
26.

26 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 1221 (2000, Supp. 12001, & West Supp. 2004).
Waxenberg, supra note 22, at 106-07.
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was when the decedent paid for it. If the basis for capital gains tax
was the decedent's cost, much more capital gain tax would normally
be payable. For example, suppose a decedent bought IBM stock in
1962 and died in 2002, willing it to his daughter. The capital gain
would be computed on what the stock was worth in 2002, not 1962.
Since the value of IBM stock has increased many times since 1962, if
the daughter sells he stock, she would pay substantially more capital
gains tax if the 1962 value were used. Under the estate tax repeal as
it currently stands, the stepped-up basis will be eliminated.
The estate tax presently provides for an unlimited marital
deduction. 27 This generally means that a surviving spouse may take any
or all of the decedent's property with no limit on amount without paying
any tax at all. 28 Property given to charitable institutions is also
generally not subject to tax. 2 9 This provision, commonly referred to as
the "charitable deduction," allows the decedent to give property to
charitable institutions and thereby prevents the government from taxing
it. 3° It is widely believed that the charitable deduction serves to
encourage charitable giving.
The estate tax law also provides for various deductions besides the
marital and charitable deductions. Examples include debts and claims
against the estate, costs of administration, funeral expenses and the like,
31
which are all deductible.
After all deductions, the tax rate is applied to any balance
remaining. 32 The top rate has varied from a high of seventy-seven
percent during 1954 to 1976 to fifty-five percent from 1984 to 2001,
with the top rate to be lowered to forty-five percent by 2009. 33 The
federal estate tax also provides for credits that may be deducted from
the amount of tax that the estate has to pay after the rate is applied to the
net estate (i.e., the amount left after subtracting the deductions).3 4 One
of the more important credits was for state death taxes that were
27. 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (2000).
28. Waxenberg, supra note 22, at 125.
29. 26 U.S.C. § 2055 (2000); Waxenberg, supra note 22, at 127-28.
30. 26 U.S.C. § 2055 (2000).
31. 26 U.S.C. § 2053 (2000 & Supp. 12001).
32. 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2000 & Supp. 1 2001).
33. JOHNSON & ELLER, supra note 19, at 13; James F. Gulecas & Alan S. Gassman, The
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001: Practical Estate Planning, THE
PRAC. TAX LAW., Summer 2001, at 35, 38; Mayling Birney & tan Shapiro, Death and Taxes: The
Estate Tax Repeal and American Democracy, Yale University, at 6, at http://www.princeton.edu/
-cdsp/events/pdfs/ BimeyShapiro.pdf (Oct. 5, 2003).
34. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2010-15 (2000 & Supp. 12001); 26 U.S.C. § 2016 (2000), amended by Pub.
L. No. 107-47, § 411(h), (x), 116 Stat. 46, 53.
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payable. A majority of the states imposed taxes that were equal to the
maximum federal credit. 3 5 Thus, the estates paid no more total tax.

The effect of the credit was to "pickup" some of the estate tax that
would otherwise go to the federal government and give it to the state
instead. In effect, it was a form of federal revenue sharing with the
states. The estate tax repeal law provides for the gradual elimination of
the state death tax credit. 3 6 To make up for the loss of revenue caused
by the elimination of37this credit, at least nineteen states have enacted
new state death taxes.
THE CENTURIES-OLD DEBATE ABOUT DEATH TAXES

Whether property transfers at death should be taxed has been debated
for centuries. In a recent textbook on trusts and estates, the authors
refer to the federal estate tax as "highly contentious." 3 8

That

description is accurate. In the 17th century, English philosopher John
Locke argued that parents had a natural law right to pass their property
to their children. 39 "[N]ature appoints the descent of their Property to
their Children, who thus come to have a Title, and natural Right of

Inheritance to their Fathers [sic] Goods, which the rest of Mankind
cannot pretend to. ' A0 There are people today in the United States who

adhere to Locke's view. Some have a deeply held moral belief that the
right to pass on wealth to survivors is fundamental.4 1 Others believe
that the estate tax is a means of transferring the property of the
deserving to the unworthy. 42 It should not be surprising that the subject
of estate and inheritance taxes can arouse strong emotions.

35. Michael G. Kaplan, Will the Disappearing State Death Tax Credit Deliver a Knock-Out
Punch to the Tennessee Inheritance Tax?, TENN. B.J., May 2003, at 28, 29.
36. Id. It has been estimated that the elimination of the credit will result in a loss of revenue
to the states of $100 billion over ten years. Id. at 28.
37. Susan T. Bart, This is Me Leaving You: Illinois Departs From the Federal Estate Tax
Scheme, ILL. B.J., Jan. 2004, at 20, 22.
38. William M. McGovern, Jr. & Sheldon F. Kurtz, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 665 (3d ed.
2004).
39. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 206-07, 210 (Peter Laslett ed., student
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1690).
40. Id. at 207.
41. In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the complete
abolition of the transfer of property to heirs or devisees could be an unconstitutional taking of
property. Conversely, there is no question that estate and inheritance taxes, even at very high
rates, are constitutional.
42. See, e.g., Art Linkletter, Paying From the Grave, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Aug.
30, 2000 (arguing that the estate tax is unfair because it targets successful people), availableat
LEXIS, News & Business, Scripps Howard News Service, http://www.lexisnexis.com. Art
Linkletter is a veteran television personality, author, and national spokesman for United Seniors
Association. Id.

P

r
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William Blackstone disputed Locke's view.
According to
Blackstone, there was no natural right to transfer property at death to
successive generations. 43 Government had the right to control transfers
of property from the dead to the living. English Utilitarian philosopher
Jeremy Bentham advocated regulation of inheritances "in order to
prevent too great an accumulation of wealth in the hands of an
individual....
Andrew Carnegie favored a confiscatory inheritance
tax so that the wealthy would use their fortunes during their lifetimes
for the public good.4 5

By the twentieth century, some supported estate taxes because they
believed that concentrations of wealth passed from generation to
generation retarded social mobility. Andrew Carnegie was a prominent
proponent of this view. 46 If advancement in business, education and
other endeavors was substantially aided by inherited wealth, those with
the most ability did not rise to leadership and accomplishment as
frequently and as much as they should. A meritocracy tends to promote
and reward the best and most able; a system heavily influenced by
inherited advantages does not. An ideal meritocracy would insure that
those with the most ability would be able to use it to the fullest extent,
without being retarded by the circumstance of having poor ancestors or
a cultural background non-conducive to the development of talent. In
2001, Warren Buffett used this basic rationale to support his opposition
to the repeal of the estate tax.
In an interview with The New York Times, 4 7 Buffett said that the
estate tax "promot[ed] economic growth, by helping create a society in
which success is based on merit rather than inheritance.'' 48 He stated
that:
[R]epealing the estate tax would be a terrible mistake, the equivalent
of choosing the 2020 Olympic team by picking the eldest sons of the
gold-medal winners in the 2000 Olympics. We would regard that as
absolute folly in terms of athletic competition ... We have come
43.

JOHNSON & ELLER, supra note 19, at 3.

44.

RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY 18

(1982).

45. Andrew Carnegie, Administration of Wealth, in THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH AND OTHER
TIMELY ESSAYS 22 (Edward C. Kirkland ed., 1965). Carnegie also believed that a "thoughtful
man" would rather leave his children a curse than the "almighty dollar." Id. at 21.
46. Peter Dobkin Hall, Andrew Carnegie and the "Gospel of Wealth", in DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF PHILANTHROPY AND VOLUNTARISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1600-1900 11 (Peter

Dobkin Hall ed.), at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-phall/dochistcontents.htnl

(last visited Jan. 4,

2005).
47. David Cay Johnston, Dozens of Rich Americans Join In Fight to Retain the Estate Tax,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, at Al.
48. Id.
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closer to a true meritocracy than anywhere else around the world.
You have mobility so people with talents can be put to the best use.
Without the estate tax, you in effect will have an aristocracy of wealth,
the resources of
which means you pass down the ability to command
49
the nation based on heredity rather than merit.
THE CAMPAIGN FOR REPEAL

The current effort to repeal the estate tax probably began in earnest in
1992 when Representative Richard Gephardt proposed an increase in
the estate tax. 50 Gephardt's proposal created a "strong and...
unexpected backlash.",5 At about this time, Patricia Soldano, an estate
planner from Orange County, California, began to organize a coalition
Eventually, the Washington, D.C. lobbying
in support of repeal.
industry was effectively employed. 53 Some rich families contributed
substantial funds to finance "lobbying, strategizing, and coordinating
indirect outside pressure for estate tax repeal.",54 From this funding,
"[m]any millions in lobbying expenditures-and uncountable hours in
coordinating member contacts with elected officials-were made by
By the late 1990s, estate tax repeal acquired a
lobbying groups....
populist flair. 6 Polling from the late 1990s onward has consistently
shown that sixty to seventy percent of peogle support repeal.57 Repeal
appeared to have a broad base of support. While there is little doubt
that the heart of the support was from the Republican party--especially
its right wing-liberal Democrats in the House, such as Neil
Abercrombie of Hawaii and the Congressional Black Caucus, also
supported repeal.59
As discussed above, the estate tax is a fairly technical subject that is
not well understood by the general population. The public also has an
inaccurate notion of the breadth and impact of the tax. A number of
surveys have shown that the public believed that the tax applied to a far
49. Id.
50. Birney & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 4.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See GATES & COLLINS, supra note 19, at 56 (describing the efforts of Washington
lobbying organizations, think tanks, public opinion research, and communications experts to
disseminate anti-tax arguments to public forums such as radio programs and newspapers).
54. Birney & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 16.
55. Id.
56. Id.at 2.
57. Id.at 7.
58. Id at 4.
59. Id. at 2.
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greater percentage of the population than was the case. For example, in
a 2003 opinion survey sponsored by National Public Radio, the Kaiser
Foundation and Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, half of the
respondents thought that it was true that most families have to pay a
federal estate tax when61 someone dies. 60

that they did not know.

Eighteen percent responded

MISCONCEPTIONS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS

During the course of the campaign for repeal, misrepresentations of
fact surfaced.

Most serious was "spin" presenting the estate tax as a

death tax that destroyed small businesses and forced family farmers off
the land.6 2 In fact, the majority of beneficiaries of tax repeal will be the
family members or other beneficiaries of the rich.6 3 In their media
placements, repeal proponents failed to mention this fact. The reason
for the failure is obvious. "Imagine a series of advertisements with
profiles of the true beneficiaries of estate tax repeal. Picture a group of

third-generation millionaires, teenagers draped in Armani clothes and
jewelry, standing in front of their mansions and fancy cars. One of
them earnestly pleads, 'I've never worked a day in my life and I'm
hoping I never to have to. Please repeal the estate tax."' 6 4 Instead, the
"poster child" of the repeal movement was the family farmer.
Repeal proponents argued that the estate tax was driving family
farmers off the land. When challenged to produce documented cases,
the proponents initially could produce none.6 5 In fact, farms and other
60. Larry M. Bartels, Unenlightened Self-Interest; the Strange Appeal of Estate-Tax Repeal,
THE AM. PROSPECT, June 2004, at A 17, A 18.
61. Id.
62. See William W. Beach, Time to Repeal Federal Death Taxes: The Nightmare of the
American Dream, The Heritage Foundation, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/
BG1428ES.cfm (Apr. 4, 2001) (asserting that "[s]mall-business owners, particularly minority
owners, suffer anxious moments wondering whether the business they hope to hand down to their
children will be destroyed by the death tax bill"); J.D. Foster, Is the Estate Tax a (Revenue)
Loser?, Tax Foundation, at http://www.taxfoundation.org/estatetaxrevenue.html (Dec. 1999)
(identifying one reason for repealing the estate is that it prevents small businesses and farmers
from passing their businesses on to the next generation).
63. For example, in 1998, 47,483 estates owed estate tax. These estates represented only
2.1% of adult deaths. Of the estates subject to tax, fifty-one percent of the taxes were paid by
estates in excess of $5 million--only five percent of all taxable estates. William G. Gale & Joel
Slemrod, Rhetoric and Economics in the Estate Tax Debate, at 4, at http://www.brookings.edu/
views/papers/gale/20010522.htm (May 22, 2001).
64. GATES & COLLINS, supranote 19, at 65-66.
65. As of April 2001, the American Farm Bureau Federation - a major supporter of repeal could not cite a single instance of a family farm that was forced out of business because of the
estate tax. Gale & Slemrod, supra note 63, at 10. A few cases of sales due to estate taxes have
been documented. See, e.g., Elizabeth Allen, Saving the Homestead: Reviled Estate Tax Actually
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small businesses account for no more than eleven percent of assets in
taxable estates: a "vast majority of estate taxes are paid by people who
own neither farms nor small businesses. ' 66 Furthermore, any impact on
family farms or small businesses could easily be eliminated by an
million. 67
increase of the exemption to an appropriate level, say $10
When the repeal bill was nearing passage in 2001, Democrats did offer
a compromise that would have substantially raised the exemption while
retaining the stepped up basis. 6 8 Or, alternatively, Democrats offered to
fully exempt small businesses and farmers. 69 The offer was rejected
and the coalition of repeal proponents held firm in their demand for
total repeal.7 ° It is remarkable that the family farmer and small business
interests in the repeal coalition rejected this proposal that was clearly in
their best interests in order to pursue a goal that would almost
exclusively be in the interests of the wealthiest members of the
coalition.
In reality, the estate tax does not present a threat to the existence of
the family farmer. As explained by Leon Geyer, past President of the
American Agricultural Law Association: "For most farmers and
ranchers estate taxes are not the real problem." 7 1 If some fairly basic
and inexpensive estate planning techniques are employed, the family
farmer should be able to "pass the total estate without estate taxes now
and in the future." 72 From 1989 to 1996, only an average of 6.4 percent
of taxable estates included farm assets. 73 Because only 1.3% of all
estates were taxable over this same period of time, only 0.08% of all

Has Some Supporters, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 3, 2003, at 1E (reporting on a Texas
man who was forced to sell the ranch he inherited from his mother because he was unable to pay
the estate tax bill), available at LEXIS, News & Business, San Antonio Express News,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.
66. Gale & Slemrod, supra note 63, at 13.
67. Understandably, some repeal proponents are unwilling or reluctant to accept a substantial
increase in the basic exemption as a solution for small business owners. They do not trust
Congress to adjust the exemption upward to compensate for its erosion by inflation. This mistrust
is well founded. In the past, the exemption was not adjusted upward for inflation causing the tax
to spread to more and more estates. To allay these concerns, the exemption could be tied to some
index of inflation so that it is adjusted automatically. Of course, any future Congress would not
be bound.
68. See Birney & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 5 (discussing the Democrat's proposal to raise the
estate tax exemption permanently).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 20-23.
71. L. Leon Geyer, AALA PresidentialAddress: Contentious Issues in Agricultural Law, 8
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1, 12 (2003).
72. Id.
73. Id.at 15.
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decedents were farmers having estates required to pay estate taxes. 74
According to Geyer, the real problem for family farmers is the lack of
farm and ranch profitability, not estate taxes. 75 It should not be
surprising, therefore, that repeal proponents had difficulty coming up
with actual cases of family farms being lost because of estate taxes.
There is also scant evidence that the estate tax has forced sales of
small family businesses. 7 6 The vast majority of small family businesses
do not face extinction because of the estate tax. 7 7 Furthermore, an
increase of the basic exemption to $5 or $10 million would remove any
78
possible estate tax impact on small businesses.

74. Id. at 15-16.
75. Id. at 12-13.
76. Some of the strongest supporters of repeal have been large family businesses: Gallo wines
($875 million), Blethen newspapers (over $400 million), Mars Candy ($27 billion, owned by
three family members), and Campbell's Soup ($6.5 billion shared by six grandchildren of the
founder). GATES & COLLINS, supranote 19, at 75.
77. See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 63, at 11 (citing a study that found that 77% of business
owners in their fifties would not have to liquidate any portion of the business to satisfy any estate
tax liabilities, and further arguing that this figure is far too low due to flaws in the study's
methodology).
78. Another argument for repeal that found broad acceptance was that the estate tax is unfair
"double taxation."
This argument was also one of the most persuasive made by repeal
proponents. Talk show hostess Oprah Winfrey has well stated the concept: "I think it's irritating
that once I die, 55 percent of my money goes to the U.S. government. You know why that's
irritating? Because you would have already paid nearly 50 percent." Bill Archer, Bury the Death
Tax, USA TODAY, June 9, 2000, at 17A. It is a fact that wealth taxed in a decedent's estate may
have been taxed before. For example, income or capital gains taxes may have been applied. But
multiple taxation of wealth is not limited to situations involving death taxes. For example, an
income earner, after paying income taxes, may have invested the remainder in corporate stock
with the corporation paying corporate income tax. She might have then received dividends on the
stock, possibly subject to income tax, or capital gains taxes on the sale of the stock. For another
example, income taxed money may be used to pay for gasoline, liquor or tobacco and the
accompanying excise taxes. Multiple taxation of wealth is a fact of life. From an economic
standpoint, "counting the levels of tax is an exercise in rhetoric, and has no economic
significance." Gale & Slemrod, supra note 63, at 22. More importantly, much of the wealth in
taxable estates has never been taxed previously. Under the capital gains tax law, an appreciated
capital asset generally has to be sold for a tax to apply on the appreciation. 26 U.S.C. § 1001
(2000). In tax law language, the gain has to be "realized." Many estates contain substantial
amounts of unrealized (i.e. never taxed) capital gain. For example, it was estimated "that in 1998
about thirty-six percent of all wealth held by those who died consisted of unrealized capital gains.
For estates in excess of $10 million, that figure rises to 56.4 percent." Id. at 22. The recipients of
the property from the decedent, under the stepped up basis provision discussed above, received
the property with a new basis, the value at or near the date of the decedent's death. 26 U.S.C. §
1014 (2000 & Supp. I 2001), amended by P.L. 108-357, § 413(c)(18), 118 Stat. 1508. This
provision ensured that the gain would never be subject to capital gains tax. So the estate tax, if
any, would be the only tax on the gain. The temporary estate tax repeal will also eliminate the
stepped up basis. Some estate tax repeal supporters may not have understood that the death tax
was being extinguished at the cost of a broader capital gains tax.
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CONCLUSION

Our understanding of the First Amendment is in need of some
adaptation to modem realities that the Framers of the Constitution could
hardly have envisioned. The basic assumption of the First Amendment
is "that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
79
of the public."
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
This assumption remains as true in the twenty-first century as it was in
the eighteenth. The right of the people "to petition the Government for
80
But in the past two
a redress of grievances" must remain inviolate.
hundred years, social organization and communication technology has
changed in ways that were unforeseeable in the eighteenth century.
There is a large advertising and public relations industry available for
hire that is skilled at selling any product, individual, or idea to the
public. In the Washington, D.C. area and elsewhere, there is an industry
devoted to influencing government policy.
The art and science of mass persuasion has also reached very high
levels of expertise in the latter half of the twentieth century. The
8
society that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 1 refers to no longer
exists.82 Today, it is not a simple case of intrepid journalists with
printing presses and other individuals criticizing powerful government.
Now there are powerful interests with the means to influence and even
intimidate government officials. These means include sophisticated
methods of influencing public opinion that may be directed at
government policy makers. These means are available for hire to those
willing and able to pay for them.
One of the fundamental ideals in the American democratic system is
equality of citizens in the political process. Perfect equality has never
been achieved nor is it likely to be attained, but such equality should
always be a goal. Freedom of speech is another fundamental aspect of
American democracy. As Americans, we believe that free discussion
by an informed citizenry is one of the foundations of good government.
The right of free expression is generally broad enough to encompass
dissemination of untruths and lies, but is that right so broad as to
completely insulate the advertising and public relations professionals
responsible for this misinformation?
79. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
80. U.S. CONST., amend I.
81. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
82. Id. at 270 (asserting that a newspaper's right to criticize government and public officials,
even when it is "sometimes unpleasantly sharp" criticism, is protected by "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen").
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Two of the worst dictatorships in the twentieth century were Nazi
Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union.
Both used control of
communication media to impose social control of their populace.
Governmentally manufactured lies were an essential component of
these control mechanisms. Because freedom of speech did not exist in
these regimes, there was no marketplace of ideas that could work to
expose the lies of the government. Lies may also be used by private
persons or entities to control or at least influence the population by
harnessing methods of mass persuasion. Social control or influence
based on lies is not rendered harmless just because it comes from
sources other than government.
Thus, the recent effort to repeal the Federal Estate Tax presents a
dilemma. If proponents of a political position can buy access to mass
media and public relations professionals, those proponents may use
those means to promote their objectives with untruths as well as truths.
First Amendment freedom of speech values allow them to do so.
However, this may be counter to other important values: equality of
citizens in the political process and political discourse based on the best
available information.
The underlying problem is that the founders of American democracy
were familiar with their fellow citizens discussing political issues at
meetings, face to face. The mass media that has been ushered in by the
information age did not exist, and the one true medium was print, which
was often posted in public places. Additionally, illiteracy was more
common, and thus many citizens had to rely on the spoken word for
formulations on the political issues of the day.
As detailed above, the media dynamic has changed drastically from
the days of the founding fathers. In some instances, this has benefited
society, such as brief advertisements aimed at persuading the public that
drunken driving is dangerous and unacceptable behavior. However,
brief television and radio commercials and placed "news" items by
public relations firms are not similarly helpful in informing the public
on complex political issues, such as the estate tax repeal.
Presently, there is no effective regulation of the paid professional use
of mass media to sell political positions and candidates. These
professionals are generally free to sell positions or candidates, or attack
their opponents, through distortions or even outright lies. The existing
unfair campaign laws are weak and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan83
83. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280 (holding that a public official (later extended to a
"public figure") may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood unless
he proves that the
statement was made with "actual malice").
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gives a very free hand to libel political opponents.
The author does not have any comprehensive suggestion for a
solution to these problems. Perhaps the marketplace of ideas will
somehow adjust to restore the balance so that only an acceptable
number of citizens will be fooled all or most of the time by private
propaganda. Maybe there is nothing, legally, that can be done. Perhaps
no appreciable added harm will be done by allowing money to speak
more loudly in the political process. However, the author suggests that
it may be appropriate to consider whether advertising and public
relations specialists should be regulated when they are employed to
promote political candidates or views. Lawyers are restricted by codes
of professional ethics from lying to courts and third parties in the course
of representing clients. 84 A good start to fixing the problem would be
considering somewhat similar restrictions on mass persuasion
professionals when they are hired to work in political arenas.

84.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3,4.1 (2003).

